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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC
SERVICE OF CANADA: BOLD EXPERIMENT
OR ACT OF FOLLY?
H. W. Arthurs*
I.

INTRODUCTION

March 1967 labor-management relations in the Public Service
of Canada entered a new era with the enactment of the federal
Public Service Staff Relations Act.1 In a country whose social and
economic policies have been stamped with an indelible tone of
moderation and whose labor policies have hitherto been largely derivative, the new statute must be regarded as profoundly significant.
It establishes for employees of the Canadian federal government a
regime of collective bargaining which in all essential respects parallels
that prevailing in the private sector: exclusive representation rights
for unions selected by a majority of employees in a bargaining unit;
prohibition of employer unfair practices; and obligation to bargain
in good faith; a right to strike which is inhibited only slighly by considerations of national safety or security; and binding collective
agreements which are enforceable through arbitration.
Yet it must not be thought that the new statute was enacted
without precedent or premeditation. Rather, it represented the
logical culmination of developments in public employment collective bargaining reaching back a half century or more. 2 Early Canadian industrial relations legislation, enacted during the first
decade of this century, dealt specifically ·with strike situations in
which the community had either a direct proprietary interest or a
special concern arising out of the essential nature of the industries
affected. Public utilities, railways, and coal mines were early identified as industries worthy of legislative intervention which, during
these formative years, took the relatively innocuous form of compulsory strike postponement and conciliation. In the present context,
it is particularly relevant that from the outset these federal statutes
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contemplated that employees of both private firms and governmentowned railways and municipally owned public utilities would be
permitted to engage in collective bargaining. After an inhibiting
constitutional decision which consigned jurisdiction over labor relations generally to the provinces rather than to the federal govemment,3 the provincial legislatures speedily enacted laws which once
again brought municipal public utilities within the purview of
federal conciliation procedures.4 Thus, even prior to the introduction of modem collective bargaining legislation, Canadians were
accustomed to the use of a single statute to regulate labor relations
in both the public and the private sectors.
Ontario's enactment in 1943 of the first labor relations statute5
on the Wagner Act model marked a significant development in
Canadian industrial relations. Shortly thereafter, the federal government, acting under its war emergency powers, virtually pre-empted
provincial labor legislation by itself enacting regulations patterned
after the Wagner Act. 6 This new regulatory scheme covered the
great bulk of the nation's workforce with the exception of provincial and federal civil servants. Nevertheless, a number of unions
representing municipal employees sought and obtained bargaining
rights at this time, 7 and their members have since enjoyed the normal
collective bargaining regime which prevails in the private sector.
The provinces reoccupied the legislative field after World War II,
and over a period of years passed (or revived) a variety of strike
postponement or strike prohibition statutes covering essential industries.8 Still, the practice of collective bargaining survived in these
industries and even expanded-at least in seminal form-to include
most provincial civil servants.
During this period, at least one pioneering experiment in public
sector unionism helped to eclipse once and for all the more conventional view of employment relations between a sovereign state and
its employees. In 1944, the people of Saskatchewan elected to office
a CCF (democratic socialist) government. This new government
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Snider v. Toronto Elec. Commr., [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5.
See F. ANTON, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 74 (1962).
Collective Bargaining Act, c.4, [1943] Ont. Stat. 11 (repealed 1944).
Order-in-council P.C. 1003 (1944).
See s. FRANKEL &: R. PRATT, MUNICIPAL LABOUR R:fil.ATIONS IN CANADA (1954); H.
LOGAN, TRADE UNIONS IN CANADA: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONING 294 (1948).
Among the municipalities whose employees were organized (as appears from reports
of various Labour Relations Board decisions) were the cities of Toronto, and Timmins, Ont., Winnipeg, Man., and Halifax, N.S.
8. See Arthurs, supra note 2.
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promptly enacted a statute on the model of the Wagner Act which
it accepted unreservedly as applicable to provincial civil servants.9
As a result, from 1944 until 1966 Saskatchewan treated public and
private employment relations as indistinguishable. In 1966 a serious
strike threatened the publicly owned Saskatchewan Power Corporation; only then did the provincial government enact emergency
dispute legislation10 which outlawed strikes endangering the public
interest but did not othenvise interfere with collective bargaining.
By 1966, the province of Quebec had similarly normalized its
collective bargaining relations with unions representing public
employees, subject only to fairly limited restraints on the timing
and extent of strikes.11 By this time, as well, most provincial
legislatures had brought municipal governments and their employees fully within the provisions of generally applicable collective
bargaining statutes, subject only to legislation governing the right
of essential employees to strike.12
Three constitutional facts partially explain the relative ease
with which collective bargaining spread at the municipal and provincial levels in Canada. First, the immunity of the state (in Canadian parlance, "the Crown") from general legal rules governing
private relations is nothing more than a common-law principle
which can be overridden simply by passing a statute. In Saskatchewan, for example, all that was necessary to extend collective bargaining rights to public employees was for the legislature to define
"employees" in such a way as to include those employed by the
provincial government.13 Second, municipalities in Canada have
never been regarded as sovereign political entities. Rather, they are
creatures of provincial legislation, enjoying only such power as
might be delegated to them by the province; a corollary is that they
enjoy only those immunities conferred by the province. 14 A third
consideration, perhaps more practical than legal, is the position of
the executive in a parliamentary system of government. By con9. Trade Union Act 1944, c.69, §§ 2(5)-(6), [1944] Sask. Stat. (2d. sess.) 207 [now
SASK. REv. STAT. c. 287, §§ 2(e)-(f) (1965)].
10. The Essential Services Emergency Act 1966, c.2, [1966] Sask. Stat. (2d sess.) 2.
11. Labor Code, QUE. REv. STAT. c.141, § 99 (1964), as amended, Act of June 17,
1965, c.50, [1965] Que. Stat. (vol. 1) 461; Civil Service Act, c.14, §§ 68-75, [1965) Que.
Stat. (vol. 1) 157.
12. In Ontario, for example, a legislative provision enabling municipalities to opt
out of the Labour Relations Act was repealed. Act of May 18, 1966, c.76, § 37, [1966]
Ont. Stat. 311.
13. This was accomplished through passage of the Trade Union Act 1944, c.69,
§ 2(6), [1944] Sask. Stat. (2d sess.) 207 [now SASK. REv. STAT. c. 287, § 2(£) (1965)).
14. I. ROGERS, THE LAW OF CANADIAN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 9-10 (1959).

Michigan Law Review

974

[Vol. 67:971

stitutional custom, the party which enjoys the support of a majority
in the legislature also controls the executive branch of government.
Coupled with the fact that party discipline is strong, this means
that, for practical purposes, the executive controls the legislative
process. It would be unthinkable, then, for the legislature to refuse
to honor an agreement negotiated by representatives of the government. Although, as in a presidential system, the appropriation of
funds is ultimately the prerogative of the legislators, in a parliamentary sytsem they could refuse to honor the commitment of the executive only at the cost of bringing down the government and precipitating an election.
In addition, one potentially formidable obstacle to federal recognition of the collective bargaining rights of public employees was
simply not present in Canada in the mid-1960's. The traditional
belief-or myth-that collective bargaining is somehow intrinsically
incompatible with the dignity and functions of a sovereign state111
had been subverted by years of practical experience with labor relations on the private sector model in governmental and quasigovernmental employment.
This brief background sketch of the Canadian labor relations
scene suffices to indicate that several important impediments to the
introduction of a full-fledged system of public service collective bargaining which exist in the United States have no counterpart north
of the border. Particularly at the practical level, there were no insuperable hurdles to the enactment of the 1967 Canadian federal
law. To understand how and why the new federal statute came to
be enacted within this reasonably hospitable environment, it is
important to trace the course of employment relations in the Canadian Public Service.

II.

BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC
SERVICE OF CANADA16

Employee organization in the Canadian Public Service began in
1889 with the establishment of the Railway Mail Clerks Associa15. Cf. Finkelman, When Bargaining Fails, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE Pun•
SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 116, 120 (1967):
To my mind, references to sovereignty in this connection have the effect ••• of
anaesthetizing intelligent examination of the relations between employers and employees. • • . Ideological concepts such as sovereignty are often no more than
political myths functioning to preserve the existing social structure.
_(Professor Finkelman, formerly chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, is
now chairman of the Public Service Staff Relations Board).
16. See generally REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITI'EE ON COLLECTIVE BAil·
LIG
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tion. Postal employees soon formed similar organizations, and within
twenty years significant beginnings of a general civil service association had emerged; by 1920, even professional employees had formed
an association. However, no significant formal machinery for labormanagement consultation at the federal level appeared until 1944.
In that year, the federal government created the National Joint
Council of the Public Service of Canada to advise it on wages and
working conditions for its employees. Other bipartite advisory
groups were established in the succeeding years; one of the most
important was the Pay Research Bureau, whose function was the
development of benchmarks for public employment conditions based
on carefully selected private equivalences.17 Institutionally, the federal government's agreement in 1953 to the voluntary, revocable
check-off of dues strengthened the various employee organizations.
Whatever else these years of development represented, by the
early 1960's there was not yet a regime of collective bargaining in
the Public Service. The federal government continued to act unilaterally in fixing wages for its employees, although it was ostensibly
committed to accepting the guidance of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission, in turn, engaged in consultation with the
employee associations-initially on an informal basis, but after 1961
pursuant to a statutory mandate.18 Needless to say, neither the strike
weapon nor arbitration was considered an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism when the Civil Service Commission and employee representatives failed to agree in the course of such consultations. Moreover, no formal mechanism had emerged which
authoritatively determined the right of associations to speak on
behalf of employees at the federal level or which protected the right
of employees to join and participate in associations. However, it
was not the lack of a legal mechanism for regulating relations between the Civil Service Commission and the employee associations
which proved to be the fatal deficiency in this system. Rather, it
was the fact that the Civil Service Commission had the power only
to recommend to the federal government that the terms of employment agreed upon in consultation be implemented.
THE PUBUC SERVICE 15-42 (Canada, 1965); Herman, Collective Bargaining
by Civil Servants in Canada, in COLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBUC SERVICE; PROCEEDINGS OF THE I.R.R.A. 1966 ANNUAL SPRING MEETING 10, 15 (G. Somers ed. 1966).

GAINING IN

17. See text accompanying notes 81 and 82 infra.
18. Civil Service Act, c!,7, § 7, [1960-61] Can. Stat. 381. This 1961 legislation contemplated, in addition to consultation between the Civil Service Commission and the employee associations, direct consultation between the government and the associations.
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In 1963, the Conservative government then in power rejected a
pay increase recommended by the Civil Service Commission after
discussions with the employee associations. This action precipitated
a crisis in public service employment relations at the federal level.
By chance, this crisis coincided with a crisis in the political fortunes
of the Conservative Party; soon afterward the government fell and a
national election ensued. Since it followed the government's rejection of the "negotiated" recommendations of the Civil Service Commission, the election provided a convenient occasion for the discussion of full-blown collective bargaining rights for federal public
servants. Each of the three major political parties responded to
public inquiries from the civil service unions by supporting a
system of collective bargaining in which compulsory arbitration
would be used to resolve negotiation impasses. The Liberal Party
won the 1963 election and, after taking office, appointed the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service to
investigate the technical problems of ful:lilling its election pledge.
One particular feature of the new Liberal cabinet must be mentioned here, because it helps to explain not only the forthright discharge of an election promise, but also the nature of the committee
appointed. The Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, was himself a
former civil servant, as~were a number of his senior cabinet ministers. Given this affinity between the political leaders of the country
and their former colleagues in the federal civil service, it is not
surprising that they took immediate steps to harmonize governmentemployee relations. Similarly, it is not surprising that the committee
appointed for the purpose of executing this mission was comprised
almost entirely of senior public servants. The Chairman of the
Preparatory Committee, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, was an outstanding
and widely respected civil servant who had served the Government
of Canada for almost thirty years; other members of the Committee
included the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Secretary of the Treasury Board,19 and senior management-level civil
servants from a number of other important government departments. In addition, the Preparatory Committee sought and obtained
assistance from a number of academic experts, management and
labor professionals, and respected labor neutrals. Of course, the
committee also consulted actively with various employee associations in the public service and with the national labor centers.
19. See text accompanying notes 28 and 29 infra.
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The Preparatory Committee saw its task as essentially a technical one: How best might collective bargaining be implemented in
the Public Service? Virtually absent from the Committee's report
(and presumably also from its deliberations) was any discussion of
the fundamental, underlying political issue of whether public servants should be permitted to engage in the process of collective
bargaining. This issue was taken to have been settled by the events
of the preceding months. Accordingly, the Committee recommended
in July 1965 a complete system of collective bargaining for all federal government departments and agencies not falling within the
scope of the general federal labor relations statute applicable to
private employers and certain public service enterprises.20 The Committee proposed binding arbitration as the central method of impasse
resolution for both grievances and interest disputes.
However well conceived this system of compulsory arbitration
might have been, a successful seventeen-day postal strike rendered it
obsolete within a matter of weeks. This strike drastically transformed the attitudes of both employers and employee representatives toward the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.
In its report, the Committee had declined to recommend an explicit
legislative prohibition against public employee strikes:
Looking at the recent history of the Public Service, we concluded
that it would be difficult to justify a prohibition on grounds of
demonstrated need. We concluded also that, if a strike should ever
occur, the Government would not be without means to cope with
it. At the present time, most of the employees to whom the proposed
system would apply do not have a "right to strike" and would be
subject to disciplinary action by the employer if they were to participate in a strike. Nothing in the recommendations of the Committee is intended to change the position.21

The postal strike revealed the unintentional irony of this statement. Considerable public sympathy for the strikers forced the
government to appoint, as "the means to cope with the strike," a
fact-finding commission which largely vindicated the postal workers'
position. Although the Preparatory Committee had pointed out that
public service strikers would not be exercising a "right to strike"22
and would theoretically be subject to disciplinary action, the government realized that it could not, as a practical matter, suspend or
20. Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c.152
(1952).
21. REPORT, supra note 16, at 36-37.
22. Here the distinction between "right" and "privilege" becomes razor thin.
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discharge thousands of employees. Consequently, it confronted the
necessity of thinking the unthinkable and legalizing the illegal. At
the same time, the success of the postal strike and the growing identification of public employees with the main body of the Canadian
labor movement combined to persuade other civil service employee
associations to -demand the right to strike instead of compulsory arbitration. Even private sector unions, undoubtedly anxious
to avoid the precedent of a statute denying the right to strike, vigorously protested the proposals for compulsory arbitration. 23
As a result of this pressure, the Preparatory Committee substantially altered its original proposals. When draft legislation was
ultimately introduced in Parliament, it contained a novel formula
under which a union could elect, upon certification, to resort either
to binding arbitration or to the strike.24 After appropriate preliminary formalities, the draft statute was sent to a joint committee of
the Senate and House of Commons for study. Since a parliamentary
majority continued to elude the Liberal government, which held a
mere plurality rather than a majority of seats, there was a risk that
the deliberations of the joint committee on this controversial measure might be used for political harassment. However, a genuine
nonpartisan atmosphere prevailed. The legislators sought and
weighed the advice of employer and employee representatives in a
frank and friendly manner, and all of the participants in the work
of the joint committee made contributions which sometimes constituted significant amendments to the original scheme of the legislation. To a large extent, the manner of the statute's enactment as
much as the merit of its substantive provisions gives hope that the
Public Service Staff Relations Act will in fact prove workable. So
far, the predominant attitude of those engaged in administering
the Act and in representing the interest groups subject to its provisions seems to be one of good faith and self-restraint.

III.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE STAFF RELATIONS

A.

ACT

Coverage

The Public Service Staff Relations Act applies to all employees
in the Public Service of Canada, either in the central administra23. See Herman, supra note 16, at 22; Love, Proposals for Collective Bargaining in
the Public Service: A Further Commentary, in CoLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 16,
at 24, 26.
24. See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra. It may be significant that the first
lawful strike under the new statute was conducted by the very group of employees
whose unlawful strike had prompted this fundamental change in the legislative scheme
-the postal employees. See page 992 infra.
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tion, or in one of several autonomous agencies. The Act defines
the "employer" by reference to two lists, one of government departments and agencies forming part of the central administration, and
the other of autonomous agencies identified as "separate employers."25 Within the central administration, the Treasury Board performs the employer function; the separate employers conduct their
own labor relations. There seems to have been little rational basis for
assigning a given agency to one or the other list of employers,26 and it
must be assumed that the two lists reflect established traditions or
political sensitivities which caused some agencies to have greater
autonomy than others. It should also be noted that a number of
government-owned corporations, such as the Canadian National
Railway and Air Canada, fall under general federal labor relations
legislation.27
The Treasury Board, comprised of a committee of senior cabinet
ministers chaired by a president, has its own staff28 which represents
its "client" agencies before the various tribunals established under
the Act, conducts labor negotiations, and monitors employment conditions and grievance-handling procedures at the departmental
level. The Treasury Board represents a tendency toward centralization, modernization, and professionalization of personnel management. Still, individual government departments and agencies-including those represented by the Treasury Board-tend to value
their traditional autonomy and to cling to pre-collective bargaining
habits of employer-employee relations. To what extent these separate departmental foci of power can be displaced by the central
staff of the Treasury Board is more than a mere practical or political
problem. It also involves policy considerations as to whether, or to
what extent, specialized needs and wishes of various branches of the
Public Service should give way in the interest of national conformity. The potential for conflict created by this arrangement is
25. § 2(o) of the Act.
26. For example, the Dominion Coal Board and the National Energy Board are
both part of the central administration, while the Atomic Energy Control Board is
not; the National Film Board is a separate employer, while the National Gallery and
the National Library are part of the central administration.
27. Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c.152 (1952).
28. In fact, the Treasury Board has existed since the establishment of the first
Canadian Parliament after confederation in 1867; in a broad sense, it has always
been responsible for government finances, see Address by D. J. Love, The Personnel
Policy Branch of the Treasury Board: Its Mission, Character and Organization, Public
Personnel Association, Ottawa, Oct. 1967. The statutory authority for the Treasury
Board, and a definition of its function, is found in the Financial Administration Act,
CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c.116 (1952).
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obvious, and it would be more serious if it were not for the extreme
delicacy shown by the Treasury Board staff in its relations with the
"client" departments of government.29
Very few categories of public "employees" other than managerial
personnel are denied the right of collective bargaining under the
Act,30 and the statutory definition of managerial personnel is so
narrow that the exception covers only a minimum number of persons.31 In this connection, it is important to emphasize that there
existed in the Canadian Public Service a long-standing tradition to
link managerial and nonmanagerial personnel together in various
employee associations. The survival of this tradition in the face of
a more recent prohibition against management intervention in the
affairs of employee associations may prove to be a matter of some
controversy.32 However, the situation is not without its parallels
in the private sector, and it seems likely that over a period of time
managerial and bargaining unit personnel will by a process of attrition become more clearly disassociated. The one area in which
this process may be slow is among professional and scientific personnel who are bound together by interests and qualifications which
transcend the employment relationship. 33
29. See Love, supra note 28; Davidson, Critical Issues in Collective Bargaining in
the Canadian Federal Service, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TIIE PUBUC SERVICE: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 163 (1967).
30. Section 2(m) of the Act, which exempts managerial personnel, also exempts
casual, part-time and temporary employees, persons compensated by fees of office, and
uniformed members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
31. Section 2(u) of the Act defines a "person employed in a managerial or confi•
dential capacity" as someone who is in a position confidential to a federal judge,
minister, or deputy minister [who are themselves excluded by section 2(m)(i)], legal
officers in the Department of Justice, and a person who is designated by the employer
and found by the PSSRB
to be a person
(iii) who has executive duties and responsibilities in relation to the development
and administration of government programs,
(iv) whose duties include those of a personnel administrator or who has duties
that cause him to be directly involved in the process of collective bargaining
on behalf of the employer,
(v) who is required • • • to deal formally in behalf of the employer with a
grievance . . . .
(vi) who is not otherwise described . . . but who in the opinion of the Board
should not be included in a bargaining unit by reason of his duties and responsibilities to the employer . . • .
32. See Davidson, supra note 29, at 167-69.
33. The Professional Institute of the Public Service, a long-established organization
which represents several bargaining units, anticipated this problem by providing
"affiliate membership" for persons ineligible for inclusion in a bargaining unit. See
PROCEEDINGS, SPECIAL JOINT CoMMITrEE OF THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
ON EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBUC SERVICE OF CANADA 416-17, 425-28
(1966). The Civil Service Association of Canada, a major service.wide organization,
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B. Administration
The Act is administered by the Public Service Staff Relations
Board (PSSRB), an independent administrative tribunal. In the
common Canadian mode, the PSSRB is tripartite in composition,
with two neutral presiding officers and an equal number of members "representative ... of the interests of employees and of ...
the employer."34 To ensure the neutral members' independence,
they hold office for ten years and can be removed only by the procedure applicable to the removal of judges. The partisan members
hold office for up to seven years, subject to removal by the cabinet
"for cause.''35
Both the Arbitration Tribunal, which deals with interest disputes,36 and a corps of adjudicators, who deal with grievances,37
operate under the administrative aegis of the PSSRB.38 The Board
itself appoints members of the Arbitration Tribunal39 and nominates its chairman for appointment by the federal cabinet; 40 the
Board also nominates adjudicators for cabinet appointment.41 Moreover, the chairman of the PSSRB is empowered to appoint conciliators and expert or technical assistants.42 The Preparatory Committee
presumably devised this arrangement in order to strengthen the independence and impartiality of the Board. The Committee noted that
the Minister of Labour could hardly be expected to assume administrative responsibility for such "third party" functions as conciliation,
which normally are not performed by a labor relations board at all.
Unlike the private sector, in public employment the government does
not "stand between an employer and a group of organized employees
in a position of impartiality ...." 43 Thus, it can be fairly said that
the administration of the Act is almost completely free of public
employer control or influence.44 The importance of this point for
also sought to ensure the continued membership of non-bargaining unit personnel. Id.
at 232-33.
34. § 11(1).
35. §§ 11(2)-(3).
36. See text accompanying notes 83 and 84 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 102-16 infra.
38. The Pay Research Bureau is also administered under the PSSRB.
39. § 60(1) of the Act.
40. § 60(2) of the Act.
41. § 92 of the Act.
42. § 17(4) of the Act.
43. REPORT, supra note 16, at 25.
44. The caliber of appointments made to the PSSRB and its adjunct bodies likewise helps to explain their impartiality and independence. The chairman of the
PSSRB-the central figure in the entire scheme-is Jacob Finkelman, a former law
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the "normalization" of employer-employee relations in the public
sector can hardly be overemphasized. The Canadian arrangement is
far more likely to win the confidence of public employees than the
typical advisory body in the United States. Such bodies, often created
by executive order, depend for their very existence on the grace and
favor of the appointing power, and public employees, not surprisingly, may sometimes feel that their recommendations are not completely unbiased.
Not directly involved in the scheme of collective bargaining, but
very definitely a part of the environment of employer-employee relations at the federal level, is the Public Service Commission. This
Commission administers the Public Service Employment Act, 45
which establishes and implements the civil service or "merit"
system of appointments and promotions, and provides a vehicle
for employee training and development programs. This area of
responsibility is much smaller than that exercised by the old Civil
Service Commission prior to the advent of collective bargaining in
the public sector. However, there are still problems of delimiting
the jurisdictional boundaries between the Public Service Commission and the other bodies engaged in administering the collective
bargaining relationship.
C.

Establishing the Bargaining Relationship: Operative
Provisions of the A ct

Under the Act, a certified bargaining agent enjoys exclusive
bargaining rights for all employees within an appropriate bargaining unit for both negotiation and grievance purposes,46 subject only
to timely displacement by a rival union47 or to revocation of certification because of loss of support,48 fraud, 49 or abandonment. 50 The
Act requires certification as a basis for all bargaining relationships 51
in order to avoid the risk that the employer will deal with a favored
union which does not enjoy the support of a majority of employees.
teacher and for many years chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the
nation's busiest labor tribunal. The chairman of the Arbitration Tribunal is Justice
Andre Monpettit of the Superior Court of Quebec, an experienced labor mediator.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

C.71, § 2, [1966-67] Can. Stat.
§ 40(l)(a) of the Act.
§ 40(l)(b) of the Act.
§ 41(4) of the Act.
§ 43 of the Act.
§ 42 of the Act.
§ 49 of the Act.
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In this respect, the federal public service legislation differs from
comparable private sector statutes which permit voluntary recognition. The Act does not specify the method by which a union is to
demonstrate its majority status on an application for certification.
However, the Board has adopted a rule of thumb which accords
certification outright to unions which can demonstrate a membership exceeding fifty-two per cent of the employees in the bargaining
unit; unions which can demonstrate substantial (but lesser) support
must submit to a secret ballot vote. 52
After the Act became operative, considerable controversy arose
as to which employee organizations were eligible for certification.
The stakes were high, since disqualification would preclude an organization from participating in the race to win bargaining rights
for virtually the entire Public Service. Three related cases illustrate
the problems presented. 53 In anticipation of the new statute, several
major public service employee associations had joined together to
form the Public Service Alliance of Canada. In the Hospital Services
case, the constitutionality of this coalition was challenged and the
evidence of membership tendered by the group was impugned.
The PSSRB sustained the Alliance on both counts, declining
to evaluate the internal mechanisms by which the former organizations had agreed to merge, and accepting as evidence of continuing
membership in the Alliance dues checked off after the merger on
the basis of premerger authorizations. An adverse ruling would
have prevented some of the major intended beneficiaries of the Act
-the former employer associations--from participating in the critical contests for initial certification merely because they had combined.
In the Ships' Crews case it was argued that a union which comprised
both civil servants and private sector employees was ineligible for certification. The fear was that such a union might be unresponsive,
or possibly inimical, to the interests of the Public Service. The
Board also rejected this contention, finding in the legislative history
of the Act no intention to grant a monopoly of representation
52. It should be noted that the logistics of taking a vote present potentially staggering problems. How should the Board conduct a ballot of ships' crews on a number
of vessels which may be on the high seas for months at a time? What of lighthouse
keepers who are virtually inaccessible except by helicopter? In such difficult circumstances, problems of communication and of the integrity of the secret ballot have
been met with considerable ingenuity by the Board and with some degree of realism
by the parties.
53. To date, the PSSRB has made copies of its significant decisions available on
request. Publication and distribution of a formal series of reports will begin in the
near future.
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rights to the old-line civil service associations. However, the Board
warned that the status of a union representing both public and
private employees might be jeopardized should the Board find that
extrinsic considerations were interfering with its representation of
public employees. Finally, the Council of Postal Unions case raised
the fundamental question whether certification should be granted to
a union which disenfranchised certain persons within the bargaining unit which it claimed to represent. Here the Board drew the
line, insisting that upon certification the union was required to
accord membership rights to all employees in the bargaining unit. 54
In the same case, the PSSRB insisted that a newly formed Council
of Postal Unions be established according to constitutional processes
through which each constituent member would be required to participate in collective bargaining.
Definition of the appropriate unit for bargaining is a potentially
difficult problem because of the unity of the management structure
(at least in the central administration), and the need to preserve
uniformity of employment conditions within the Public Service.
The process is complicated by geographic dispersion of employees,
the nationalist impulse among federal employees in Quebec, fear
among some occupational groups that they will be burdened with
the lesser bargaining power of other groups, and other strong
centrifugal forces. In order to save the PSSRB from dealing with
these problems during the hectic period immediately after the introduction of collective bargaining into the Public Service, the Act
established a number of statutory bargaining units for the duration
of the "initial certification period.'' 55 These statutory bargaining
units reflected a new system of job classification which had been introduced by the Civil Service Commission in 1964. The Act divided
the central administration into seventy-two functional groups and
then clustered these groups into five broad occupational categories:
scientific and professional, administrative and foreign service, technical, administrative support, and operational. During the initial
certification period the Board was obliged to adhere to these statutory bargaining units unless it determined "that such a bargaining
54. Section 39(3) of the Act explicitly makes ineligible for certification any union
"that discriminates against any employee because of sex, race, national origin, colour,
or religion."
55. Section 26 of the Act authorizes the Public Service Commission to "specify and
define the several occupational groups within each occupational category" established
by the statute. During the initial certification period these occupational groups are
intended to be coterminous with bargaining units.
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unit would not permit satisfactory representation of employees ...
and ... would not constitute a unit of employees appropriate for
collective bargaining," 56 or unless it became necessary to divide an
occupational group into separate supervisory and nonsupervisory
bargaining units. The initial certification period for each broad occupational category was to last for a period of approximately twenty
months. Thereafter, upon application, the PSSRB could redefine
bargaining units so long as it maintained the integrity of the broad
occupational categories established by the statute. 57 Moreover, in the
interest of uniformity throughout the Public Service, the Board was
required to "have regard to" the nature of the established classification structure in any redefinition of bargaining units. 58
Given the enormous tasks associated with bringing the legislation into operation, the idea of the initial certification period seems
sound. Imposition of predetermined boundaries on bargaining units
undoubtedly inhibited some employees from associating together
for collective bargaining purposes, but it did expedite the certification process, and in the long run probably strengthened the collective bargaining system. Moreover, the experience gained during the
initial certification period will presumably aid the Board should
subsequent redefinitions of the appropriate units for bargaining
prove necessary. To date, virtually all occupational groups within
the central administration and among the separate employers have
applied for certification. The Board has granted certificates to
seventy-five bargaining units, comprising approximately eighty per
cent of the 206,000 eligible employees in the Public Service. 59
D. Protection of Basic Rights
The basic approach of the Preparatory Committee which proposed the Act was to seek normalization of labor relations in the
Public Service:
Legislation governing industrial relations in the private sector
usually contains a number of provisions designed to protect the
integrity of the collective bargaining relationship, including: a
declaration of the freedom of employees to belong to any organization of their choice; a prohibition of employer interference in the
56. § 26(5)(a) of the Act.
57. § 32 of the Act.
58. § 32(2) of the Act.
59. Approximately 170,000 employees are now included in bargaining units. Of
these, 120,000 are represented by the Public Service Alliance of Canada (successor to
the pre-collective bargaining employee associations), and 25,000 are represented by the
Council of Postal Unions.
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organization or administration of any employee organization; and
an assurance that employees may exercise their rights without
threats, intimidation or reprisals from agents of employee organizations or the employer.
In the opinion of the Preparatory Committee, the principles
underlying provisions of this kind are of fundamental importance
and should be made to apply clearly to the Public Service system.60
The legislation, as finally enacted, reflects this basic philosophy of
the Preparatory Committee. The Act clearly proclaims freedom of
employee association61 and forbids interference with that freedom
by managerial personnel. In particular, the Act prohibits employer
domination of unions, 62 discrimination in employment against
unionists, and other analogous coercive tactics. 63 These prohibitions
are enforceable by a procedure for filing complaints against the employer and any person acting on its behalf.64
The PSSRB has jurisdiction to hear and determine such complaints, to make remedial orders, and to invoke two different sanctions to ensure compliance. The Board may either make a report
of noncompliance to Parliament65 (which would undoubtedly be
extremely embarrassing to the government) or consent to the prosecution of any individual who has violated the prohibitions contained in the Act. 66 However, beyond reporting to Parliament, no
sanctions are directly available against the government itself. It is
clear that conformity to the policy of the law ultimately depends on
the government's willingness to comply rather than the fear of sanctions. Isolated acts of antiunionism are likely to occur, if at all, at
the lower echelons of management or at points geographically remote from the main administrative centers. If the Treasury Board
is able to assume control over such situations and to apply the neces60. REPORT, supra, note 16, at 26.
61. § 6 of the Act.
62. § 8(1) of the Act.
63. § 8(2) of the Act.
64. § 20 of the Act.
65. § 21 of the Act.
66. § 106 of the Act. The statute does not explicitly indicate that unfair practices
or violations of remedial orders are criminal offenses, although reference is made in
section 106 to "prosecution arising out of an alleged failure to observe any prohibition
contained in section 8." Section 107 of the Criminal Code, c.51, [1953-54] Can. Stat. 365.
provides: "Everyone who ... contravenes an Act of the Parliament of Canada ••• is,
unless some penalty or punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years," Presumably, prosecution under
this section is contemplated; certainly, the legislative intention was that prosecution
should be the ultimate enforcement procedure. See Proceedings, supra note 33, at 917.
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sary corrective measures, effective self-policing on the employer side
will make it unnecessary to invoke the enforcement machinery of
the statute. To date, there have been few complaints of unfair labor
practices, and the enforcement provisions of the Act have not been
invoked.

E. Collective Bargaining: Arbitration or Strike?
The Act requires both the employing agency and the bargaining
agent, upon timely notice, "to bargain collectively in good faith and
make every reasonable effort to conclude a collective agreement." 67
As a reflection of the statute's general adherence to private sector
principles, this admonition is hardly surprising. It is the procedure
for impasse resolution which represents the most novel (and, some
say, the most radical) feature of the statute. Following certification,
the bargaining agent for each certified union is required to choose
between two procedures "for resolution of any dispute to which it
may be a party": 68 arbitration or a process of conciliation. 69
Since arbitral awards are "binding on the employer and the bargaining agent ... and on the employees," 70 choice of the arbitration
option forecloses the possibility of a strike.71 However, no comparable binding effect accompanies the report of a conciliation board,
and there are no prohibitions elsewhere in the ·statute which would
preclude a post-conciliation strike. By inference, then, strikes are
permitted following exhaustion of the conciliation process.
The failure to announce affirmatively the existence of a right to
strike is hardly surprising. In the first place, no Canadian court has
ever clearly held that strikes by public servants are per se illegal; 72
thus there was no need for Parliament to reverse an existing legal
norm. Second, while it is true that Canadian labor relations statutes
have seldom contained an express reference to the right to strike,
the courts have recognized that such legislation impliedly incorporates the common-law right to strike.73
The Act does not, however, entirely abandon the public interest
in the continued operation of government to the whim of nego67. § 50 of the Act.
68. § 36(1) of the Act.
69. § 2(w) of the Act.
70. § 72(1) of the Act.
71. This point is made explicit by section I0I(l)(b) of the Act.
72. The issue was raised, and avoided, in A. G. British Columbia v. Ellsay ie B.C.
Govt. Employees Assn. [1959] CLLC 15,262 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
73. Regina v. CPR ex rel. Zambri, [1962] S.C.R. 609.
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tiators. If a union has elected to resolve its collective bargaining
impasses by a process of conciliation-and, impliedly, by a strikerather than by arbitration, the Act forbids certain "designated employees" within the bargaining unit from striking because their
duties "consist in whole or in part of duties the performance of
which at any particular time or after any specified period of time
is or will be necessary in the interest of the safety or security of the
public." 74 But it should be noted that the definition of "designated
employees" is very circumscribed. The Act denies the right to strike
only to those persons whose absence from work would imperil interests which are absolutely vital; employees whose absence would
merely imperil the "public interest," "convenience," or "welfare"
are still permitted to strike.
The procedure for identifying "designated employees" is designed to avoid controversy over this issue during the course of a
strike when the pressures of conflict would make resolution of the
matter especially difficult. Within twenty days after either party has
served a notice to bargain, the employing agency must establish a
list of essential employees. If the union does not object to the employer's list, all of the persons so identified are taken to be "designated." However, in the event that the bargaining agent files an
objection, the Board must hold a hearing to determine whether the
listed employees are really essential to the "safety and security of
the public."
In practice, the various government employers have exercised
great self-restraint in designating critical employees. Of approximately 33,000 employees in bargaining units governed by the strike
option, the government has "designated" only eighty-six. In each
case, the union has accepted the employer's unilateral judgment.
Thus, the Board has not had occasion to determine authoritatively
the meaning of the statutory phrase "safety and security of the public." Nevertheless, some clue to the meaning of this standard may be
gleaned from the Air Traffic Controllers case,75 where the only
"designated" employees were those controllers thought necessary to
provide emergency assistance to overflying and noncommercial aircraft at various airports throughout the country. Obviously, such a
small number of "designated" controllers would be inadequate to
service regular domestic commercial air traffic, which would neces74. § 79 of the Act.
75. See note 53 supra.
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sarily be suspended for the duration of a strike within this particular bargaining unit. 76
The Act does not expressly provide for the designation of additional employees during a strike if the employing agency or the
Board initially misjudged the number or type of employees necessary to protect the public interest. The PSSRB would undoubtedly
mobilize its full statutory resources to cope with such a crisis, including its power to "review, rescind, amend, alter or vary any
decision or order made by it." 77 It might well be argued that
the employer and the Board should have anticipated all contingencies in making the original choice of designated employees,
but this argument might have the unfortunate effect of prompting
the employer to exaggerate at the outset the number of designated
employees on the basis of remote contingencies.
A second series of problems concerns the relationship between
striking employees and designated employees in the same bargaining
unit. If a government employer determines that a skeleton staff is
necessary during a strike in order to provide services essential to
the "safety and security of the public," how is such a staff to be
selected from among the employees in a bargaining unit? What happens if some of the designated employees resign or become ill?
Must the same individuals continue to work throughout the strike,
or can the strikers serve in rotation? What of the risks of sabotage,
deliberate slow-dmms, or "work-to-rule" campaigns by designated
employees? And what of the wages paid to designated employees:
if the remuneration for continuing on the job exceeds strike pay,
should the designated employees be required to tum the surplus
over to the union strike fund? Although these as yet unanswered
questions are potentially troublesome, the statutory procedure for
designating employees in advance of an actual strike situation is
fundamentally sound. The fact that the parties are not locked in
conflict makes it more likely that they will agree upon the list of
designated employees. If there is disagreement, the Board can undertake the difficult adjudicative problems of defining and identifying
employees in essential services without the extra pressure of a strike
situation. Finally, if a large proportion of employees in a bargaining
unit must be designated as essential, thus impairing the union's
76. Air travellers who have been trapped for hours on the runways and in the
air corridors of New York airports because of a "work-to-rule" campaign by air
traffic controllers might regard an outright strike as a lesser evil.
77. § 25 of the Act.
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ability to strike, that fact is made obvious so that the union can opt
for arbitration at an early stage in the proceedings.
Of the fifty-three bargaining units which had elected between
arbitration and conciliation as of August 31, 1968, only eight had
chosen the latter method of impasse resolution. The forty-five units
which selected arbitration contained 79,000 employees, while the
eight strike-potential units encompassed 33,000 employees; of the
latter, some 25,000 were postal workers. Since no election has yet
been made in another twenty-nvo units containing almost 56,000
employees, the predominant pattern of impasse resolution is still
to be determined. Obviously, the developing course of negotiations
under the two systems of dispute resolution will directly influence
not only the choices of the remaining undecided units but also the
decisions of units which may want to alter their previous elections.78
To date, experience under each system has been relatively satisfactory. It has frequently been suggested that when the possibility
of a strike is removed, collective bargaining will deteriorate because
the disputing parties will prefer to take their chances with an arbitrator rather than to conclude an agreement through direct negotiations.79 However, the limited experience under the Public Service
Staff Relations Act suggests that arbitration does not necessarily
spell the end of real collective bargaining. Some twenty agreements
covering 55,000 employees have now been signed in bargaining
units governed by the arbitration option. Of these, all but two or
three were the product of direct negotiations unassisted by even a
conciliator; 80 the Arbitration Tribunal has yet to hear a single case.
To be sure, several unusual circumstances may have contributed
to the enviable record of the bargaining units which opted for arbitration. First, it must be remembered that the unions concerned
have voluntarily abandoned their right to strike. It might be assumed, therefore, that they have decided to approach collective
bargaining in a more responsible, less militant, manner than their
private sector or strike-potential, public sector counterparts. Second,
the government is aware that disillusionment with bargaining under
the arbitration option would surely lead a union to change its
option at the earliest opportunity. Accordingly, it is reasonable to
78. Section 38 of the Act provides for alteration of the process of dispute resolution.
79. See K.heel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 938, 939-40
(1969).
80. Under section 52 of the Act, either party may apply to the Chairman of the
PSSRB for "the assistance of a conciliator in reaching agreement," although appointment of a conciliator is not mandatory.
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assume that the government's bargaining stance has been one of
flexibility and restraint.
Beyond these short-run considerations, the institutional arrangements provided by the statute undoubtedly contribute to the amicable settlement of disputes. Perhaps most important in this regard
is the provision of a factual framework for enlightened bargaining.
The Pay Research Bureau, established in 1957, has obtained the
cooperation and confidence of the government and the employee
associations both in gathering and in disseminating data useful in
the bargaining process. 81 By largely removing factual issues from
the realm of controversy, the Bureau enables negotiators to focus
attention on the admittedly difficult task of choosing the criteria by
which those facts are to be evaluated. Second, if the parties fail to
resolve their differences in direct negotiation, the dispute does not
pass directly to arbitration. Instead, the Act provides for the intervention of a conciliator on the request of either party.82 Only if the
conciliator fails to bring the parties together does the focus shift
from bargaining to binding third-party determination.
If and when it is necessary to resort to arbitration, the Act contains elaborate provisions to ensure that the issue will be clearly
and narrowly defined for the arbitrator.83 The Arbitration Tribunal, moreover, is not simply left to speculate upon the principles
by which public employment working conditions are to be fixed.
The Act provides the Arbitration Tribunal-and presumably negotiators seeking to avoid arbitration-with specific criteria for determining wages and working conditions.84 While these standards
are admittedly broad, they at least constitute an attempt by Parliament to discharge its legislative obligations by stating that public
employees are to enjoy employment conditions comparable to those
in the private sector. Coupled with the data generated by the Pay
Research Bureau and submitted to the scrutiny of an Arbitration
Tribunal staffed by highly competent men, these legislative guidelines are likely to produce a decision which the disputants will
respect. Certainly, neither party need fear that arbitration involves
risks of irresponsible or ill-informed third-party determinations. Indeed, the very rationality of the arbitration process may encourage
81. See Gauthier, Pay Research and Employee Relations in the Canadian Federal
Service, in K. ,VARNER &: J. DONOVAN, PRACTICAL GUIDELINES TO PUBLIC PAY AnMIN•
ISTRATION 156 (1965).
82. § 52 of the Act.
83. See Kheel, supra note 79, at 939, 941.
84. § 68 of the Act.
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the parties to simulate it in private negotiations, and thus avoid
arbitration altogether.
In the case of bargaining units which opted for the right to
strike, the experience to date is somewhat less than conclusive.
While the air traffic controllers were able to negotiate an agreement without recourse to a strike, 25,000 postal workers who apparently felt obliged to employ the ultimate sanction called a postal
strike which lasted for nineteen days-from July 18 to August 8,
1968. This was hardly a surprising development. In 1965 the postal
workers had resorted to a seventeen-day walkout; on several other
occasions, national and local union groups had threatened strike
action. A number of factors contributed to the militancy of these
groups: deep-seated grievances against poor working conditions; departmental management which was understaffed and ill-prepared for
collective bargaining; a new union leadership cognizant of the fact
that their predecessors had been purged as "moderates"; and overtones of French Canadian nationalism in the Montreal local union.
Circumstances beyond the immediate control of the parties added
several ingredients to this witches' brew: a federal election occurred
in the midst of bargaining; a new Postmaster-General took office;
critics called for an overhaul of postal services and mail rates; and
the government attempted to restrain inflation by encouraging a
policy of wage restraint throughout the economy.
Bargaining began at a slow, almost fatalistic pace. While the
parties made some progress on minor items, and although a board
of conciliation succeeded in resolving other issues, the government
made no response to the union's unrealistically high wage demand
until the very eve of the strike. Predictably, this last-minute move
proved "too little, too late," and the first legal strike of Canadian
federal workers began. Much more unpredictable was the comparatively mild reaction of the Canadian public. To some extent, the
press was sympathetic to the grievances of the employees and critical
of the government's failure to make an earlier wage offer; thus, it
initially adopted a fairly neutral attitude. Having learned the lessons of the previous mail strike in 1965, many businesses had made
arrangements to continue serving customers and collecting accounts
for the duration of the strike. Welfare agencies and similar organizations also provided emergency services to their clientele through
alternate devices. While there was some inconvenience and extra
expense, the strike did not appear to cause a major communications
crisis.

March 1969]

The Public Service of Canada

993

As the strike progressed, however, the patience of the public
began to wear thin, and pressure mounted for legislation to end the
walkout. The government's position was awkward indeed. It was
reluctant to withdraw the right to strike on the very first occasion
upon which it had been exercised, and it was equally hesitant to
undertake the task of suppressing the almost certain defiance which
a back-to-work order would bring. On the other hand, the government could hardly afford to capitulate to union demands. The
postal workers were seeking wage increases beyond those which had
been accepted by unions subject to arbitration; moreover, it was
doubtful that the militant union members would even accept
any recommendation made by its negotiating team. Thus, while the
government was under increasing pressure to end the strike, it could
not afford to reach a settlement with the postal workers which would
destroy the faith of other unions in the efficacy of the arbitration
option. Finally, such factors as veiled threats of special antistrike
legislation, increasing public hostility toward the strike, and financial pressure on the individual union members (who received no
strike pay) helped to move the union toward settlement. After further concessions by the employer and the vigorous and imaginative
efforts of a special mediator, the parties reached an agreement. By
a narrow margin, the union membership ratified the agreement,
and the postal strike was over.
The postal strike, then, can be seen either as vindicating the
predictions of doom by detractors of the new statute or as proving
the good sense of its draftsmen. Critics would contend that the Act
proferred the right to strike to "irresponsible" unionists who used
it at the first opportunity to the considerable inconvenience, if not
the lasting detriment, of the country. Conversely, proponents of the
Act might argue that a postal strike was inevitable, that the statute
merely circumvented awkward problems of law enforcement, and
that the community's actual loss was negligible. Moreover, they
would contend that public inconvenience was a small price to pay
for the preservation of free collective bargaining and that the ultimate resolution of the conflict within the range of settlemen~
among bargaining units subject to arbitration augurs well for the
future of the system.
F. The Scope of Bargaining
The Preparatory Committee had clearly recommended before
passage of the Act "that legislation place no limitation on the
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subject matter of discussion at the bargaining table ...." 85 At the
same time, it proposed that arbitration (the only method of dispute
settlement then contemplated) be limited to controversies directly related to wages, hours, leave entitlement, and working conditions.
The entitlement of employees to superannuation, death benefit and
accident compensation should continue to be governed by law. Furthermore, it should be made clear that the subject-matter of arbitration may in no circumstance extend to the processes governing
appointment, transfer, promotion, demotion, lay-off, discharge, discipline and classification.s6
This attempt to permit an unlimited scope for negotiation while
withholding the means of dispute resolution for some subjects may
prove to be a source of difficulty, especially since arbitration has been
supplemented by the strike option in the final version of the statute.
A strike-potential union which is denied satisfaction on one of the
"excluded" matters may simply become intransigent over those matters which are bargainable. Even where the union has opted
for arbitration rather than the right to strike, such frustration
would necessarily impair the bargaining process. The statute, as
enacted, seems to make the scope of conciliation, arbitration, and
collective agreements coterminous, 87 but it does not expressly restrict the scope of bargaining. The parties may discuss anything,
but they are forbidden to insert any provision in a collective agreement which would require the passage of new legislation (except
for the purpose of appropriating funds) or which would detract
from the operation of the other statutes enacted as part of the comprehensive scheme for Public Service employment relations.88 In
addition, a general provision of the Act authorizes the government,
by cabinet order, to exempt itself from doing anything contrary to
the "safety or security of Canada or any state allied or associated
with Canada." 89
The latter limitation is unlikely to present significant problems,
but the former raises the possibility of a clash between the new collective bargaining regime and the older civil service system. The
Public Service Staff Relations Act prohibits an arbitration tribunal
85. REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ntE
PUBLIC SERVICE 34 (Canada 1965).

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
§§ 56, 70(2), 86(2) of the Act.
§ 56 of the Act.
§

112 of the Act.
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or a conciliation board from dealing with "the standards, procedures or processes governing the appointment . . . demotion,
transfer, lay-off, or release" of employees.90 The Public Service Employment Act confers upon the Public Service Commission "the exclusive right and authority to make appointments," 91 as well as a
mandate not only to "establish the merit of candidates" for appointment92 but also to oversee the processes of promotion, demotion,
and lay-off. 93 Yet it is almost inevitable that unions will seek to
influence the determination of standards governing these important
incidents of employment. Would a strike aimed at such an objective be unlawful? Even if it were, will not the existence of a deeply
felt concern require a vehicle for its amicable resolution? Will not
the absence of such a vehicle haunt the collective bargaining process?
The Act does not provide a mechanism for easing possible tensions between the civil service system and the collective bargaining
process, except that the Public Service Commission is required
"from time to time [to] consult with representatives of any employee organization certified as a bargaining agent ... or with the
employer . . . with respect to the selection standards . . . or the
principles governing the appraisal [and] promotion . . . of employees . . . ." 94 That this potential area of difficulty has not yet
given rise to public controversy is due in part to the characteristic
pragmatism demonstrated by both unions and government administrators in the Public Service, in part to a traditional Canadian
diffidence toward litigation.
G. Implementation and Administration of Collective

Agreements: Grievances
Whether a collective agreement is the product of negotiation
or an arbitration award, it is final and binding upon the employer,
the bargaining agent, and the employees in the bargaining unit. 95
In one short passage, the Preparatory Committee brushed aside both
the practical and philosophical objections to such a provision:
[I]n many areas, the traditional authority of the Crown has been
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

§§ 70(3), 86(3) of the Act.

C. 71,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
§§ 58,

§ 8, [1966-67) Can. Stat.
§§ IO, 12, 31.
§§ 13-21 (promotion), 31 (demotion), 29 (layoff).
§ 12(3).
72 of the Act.
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circumscribed by laws that limit its freedom of action or require
its action to be brought to the attention of Parliament. The conclusion to which we have come can be simply stated: although
the arbitration of disputes represents a limitation on the historic
right of the Crown to determine unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment of those in its service, it is not likely to
interfere with the capacity of the Government to discharge its responsibility.96

That senior civil servants should give such short shrift to the
prerogatives asserted by their predecessors in office and their confreres in other jurisdictions was, as the title of this Article suggests,
either an act of folly or one of candor and courage. Of course,
implementation of a collective agreement is "subject to the appropriation by or under the authority of Parliament of any moneys
that may be required by the employer therefor." 97 The Act, while
acknowledging that the legislature retains ultimate control over the
public purse, assumes that Parliament will routinely honor agreements and awards made in accordance with its provisions. Since the
majority party in the House of Commons controls the executive
branch of government, it is unlikely that this statutory assumption
will prove to be ill-founded.
In order to facilitate implementation of the Act during the
initial round of negotiations, Parliament established a statutory
timetable for bargaining which provided that the first agreements
negotiated in each occupational category would all expire on a
specified date. 98 The legislators added a statutory stipulation that
collective agreements could be signed only after a certain date99 and
for a minimum term of one year.100 These provisions were intended
to bring the first (and hopefully subsequent) agreements in each
bargaining unit into a regular cycle of periodic pay revisions for
the entire Public Service. The obvious desirability of such an arrangement, however, collided with the imponderables of a collective
bargaining system: delays in certification due to union rivalry or
simple inexperience in organizing, delays in bargaining due to
intraunion political processes, overwork of the employer representatives, or the predictable failure of negotiators to agree promptly on
all outstanding issues. To cite but one example, the postal strike
96. REPORT, supra note 85, at 37.
97. §§ 56, 74 of the Act.
98. § 26(6) of the Act.
99. § 26(6) of the Act.
100. § 57 of the Act.
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was settled less than two months before the date fixed by law for
the expiration of the first collective agreements. While the minimum statutory term of one year could have been satisfied by making
this agreement retroactive, raw memories of the recent strike made
the prospect of a fresh round of negotiations in two months too
awful to contemplate. The parties ingeniously agreed, therefore,
to sign two agreements, one to operate retroactively and expire on
the date specified by the Act, the other to come into effect and
operate from that date forward. With the wisdom of hindsight, it
seems clear that Parliament should have established a more flexible
statutory timetable. However, the timing of representation questions-certification of new bargaining agents, severance of bargaining units, and decertification-was fixed by reference to the expiration dates of the initial agreements. 101 Thus, to have allowed a more
protracted period for the first round of negotiations would have
further postponed the opportunity for minority and dissident
groups to seek a change in representation.
Turning to the question of grievances, the Act's provisions are
indeed liberal. An employee aggrieved by unilateral employer action
relating to employment, by a collective agreement or arbitral award,
or by "any occurrence or matter affecting his terms and conditions
of employment" may present a grievance. 102 In one respect, this
broad-gauged grievance process is apparently designed more for
catharsis than for confrontation. The employee cannot pursue his
grievance to adjudication unless it involves "the interpretation or
application in respect of him of a provision of a collective agreement or an arbitral award, or ... disciplinary action resulting in
discharge, suspension or a financial penalty . . . ."103 In all other
cases, the grievance can be pursued only through discussions with
successively higher levels of management, up to (but not including)
the Minister responsible.
The private sector would do well to emulate some of the grievance procedures in the Act. First, the right to pursue grievances is
not delimited by the collective agreement alone. Thus, the opportunity exists for an employee to bring to the attention of senior
management officials sources of friction or incidents of lower-level
maladministration not covered by the contract. Second, the right to
seek adjudication of grievances in the critical area of discipline is
101. §§ 26, 41 of the Act.
102. § 90(l)(b) of the Act.
103. § 91 of the Act.
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statutory rather than contractual. As such, it extends to all employees, whether or not they are covered by a collective agreement
and whether or not they are even eligible for inclusion in a bargaining unit.104 Third, a balance is carefully struck between individual and group interests. An individual employee "owns" his
personal grievance, but he may not challenge the interpretation or
application of a collective agreement or arbitral award unless he has
the approval and assistance of his union.105 Since the interpretation
of the collective agreement might set a precedent which would affect
the entire bargaining unit, the certified bargaining agent retains
exclusive control over such grievances (except in relation to discipline) by monitoring individual claims. If no bargaining agent is
certified, of course, the e~ployee may seek representation by the
union of his personal preference. The Act also permits either party
to a collective agreement to file a grievance if the matter is not one
which may be the subject of a grievance by an individual employee.106
Adjustment of grievances is the task of a corps of "adjudicators,"
one of whom, as chief adjudicator, assumes responsibility for the
administration of the system. Adjudicators hold office for fixed
terms, and are assigned to individual cases as they arise.107 Alternatively, the parties may consent to adjudication by a tripartite board108
or by an adjudicator named in their collective agreement.109 Neither
alternative device has yet been used. Although much can be said for
naming an adjudicator in an agreement (or, indeed, on an ad hoc
basis, by mutual designation), two considerations militate against the
use of such a system: first, the obvious desire to preserve uniformity
of decision throughout the Public Service,11° and second, the fact that
the public bears the cost of grievance adjustment through the regular
104. Section 2(p)(i) of the Act provides that managerial personnel are eligible to sub•
mit and process grievances. Ironically, the first grievance to be adjudicated after the
legislation came into force was that of a personnel manager who was found to have
been improperly discharged, Caron case, file 166C-l (unreported, Sept. 21, 1967).
105. §§ 90(2), 91(2) of the Act.
106. § 98 of the Act.
107. §§ 92, 94 of the Act.
108. §§ 93, 94(2)(b) of the Act.
109. § 94(2)(a) of the Act.
110. To some extent this is achieved by the exercise of the chief adjudicator's
power to determine whether a grievance falls within the jurisdictional limits defined
in the Act and whether it is timely. PSSRB Regulations and Rules of Procedure,
SOR/67-200, as amended by SOR/68-114, § 53. Moreover, all "policy" grievances (i.e.
those filed by the employer or the bargaining agent) must be heard by the chief
adjudicator. § 98 of the Act.
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adjudicators. 111 The decisions of an adjudicator are binding on the
parties,112 and may be enforced113 or reviewed only by the PSSRB; 114
court review is precluded.115 Finally, those matters which fall within
the purview of the Public Service Commission cannot be made the
subject either of a grievance or of adjudication116
Surprisingly, the first eighteen months under the new legislative
scheme have yielded barely seventy grievances for adjudication, and
of these over one half were held to be nonjusticiable on procedural
or jurisdictional grounds. In part, the paucity of cases reflects the
preoccupation of the parties with the processes of certification and
negotiation, in part their desire to be reasonable during the difficult
initial period of adjustment. It may also reflect the absence of collective agreements which would provide a source both of new
employee rights and of interpretative difficulties. However, an
approach to adjudication has at least been articulated in terms
which may well determine its future development:
The whole spirit and intent of the Public Service Staff Relations
Act is to secure to the governmental employees covered by it ... a
regime of fair dealing which reflects concepts of industrial justice
as they have developed in the private sector. To be sure, these concepts are expressed through institutions and rules which give due
weight to the special characteristics of public employment. But the
underlying principles of the new statute are to be taken as the expression of this aspiration, rather than as the haggard reflection of
past policies ....111

IV.

CONCLUSION

I have ventured into considerable-perhaps excessive-detail in
describing the new Canadian federal statute out of a conviction
that it represents the "emperor's clothes" approach to the problems
of public service employment relations. Like the small boy in the
old folk tale, I share to a considerable degree the conviction of the
lll. § 97 of the Act. Subsections (2) and (3) provide that the Board may recover
some or all of the costs of normal adjudication, but to date this has not been done.
If the parties elect to name their own adjudicator, they must bear the costs. Thus,
financial incentives do encourage the use of the regular adjudicators.
ll2. §§ 96(4), 96(5) of the Act.
ll3. § 96(6) of the Act.
ll4. Section 23 of the Act provides for review by the PSSRB only of a "question of
law or jurisdiction" arising in connection with grievance adjudication. Such questions
may not be raised in the course of a proceeding to enforce the decision of an
adjudicator. § 96(6) of the Act.
II5. § 100 of the Act.
ll6. § 90 of the Act.
117. Caron case, supra note 104.
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draftsmen of the statute that unwarranted deference to the imaginary trappings of governmental authority has blinded us to the
naked realities of life. In functional terms, at least, many of the
arguments raised against the extension of collective bargaining to
public employees are merely ghosts of the objections to collective
bargaining in the private sector which were laid to rest a generation
or more ago.
This is not to say that public employment presents no special
problems, or that the new Canadian statute adequately deals with
all such problems. Undoubtedly, there will be difficulties in implementing the dual system of dispute settlement, in maintaining appropriate relationships between competing claims for limited public
funds, in reconciling a collective bargaining system with the platonic ideal of a civil service system, and in withstanding the temptations of unions and employing agencies to use public opinion and
political pressure as a supplement to conventional bargaining
tactics. But these reservations do not undercut the basic validity of
the legislation.
The ultimate justification for the Public Service Staff Relations
Act lies in its recognition of the need to normalize public service
employment. It is quite clear that public employees in Canada (as
well as in the United States) will no longer acquiesce in the denial
to them of rights now regarded as basic by their fellow employeecitizens in the private sector. As many public employers are coming
to realize, the choice is not between collective bargaining and unilateral control by a sovereign employer. Rather, it is between
orderly collective bargaining and chaotic, extralegal conflict.

